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Revisiting the Resource–Conflict Link: 
A Systematic Comparative Test of Causal Mechanisms in 
Four Major Oil-Exporting Countries 
Abstract 
Causal mechanisms and related contextual variables are crucial to the study of the re-
source–conflict link, but little systematic research has been done on their exact functioning. 
This paper contributes to the filling of this gap by comparing four major oil exporters 
(Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela) with differing levels of internal violence. To cap-
ture the causal complexity of the resource–conflict link we created a questionnaire with 
some 150 variables that distinguish between resource-specific (RS) and non-resource spe-
cific (NRS) conditions. The causal mechanisms are measured by assigning pertinent RS 
and NRS indicators to them. Our results suggest that the role of resources may be less 
prominent than is widely assumed. Only three resource-related causal mechanisms pro-
vide limited explanatory value (motive at subnational level, indirect economic, and institu-
tional mechanism) by distinguishing Venezuela—the most peaceful case—from all the 
others. Only a mixed mechanism that combines 13 RS and NRS (economic and geographic 
characteristics, identity, intergroup relations, as well as political and institutional varia-
bles, including elite behavior) conditions can explain the differences between the countries 
with regard to the dependent variable comprehensively.  
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1 Introduction 
Conventional wisdom holds that natural resources create both the motivation and opportu-
nities for civil war, as well as indirectly reinforcing economic, institutional, and other causes 
of internal violence. However, recent research has increasingly questioned this link. At best, 
the commodity oil is robustly linked to the onset of armed conflict (Dixon 2009; Hegre/Sam-
banis 2006; Ross 2004b; 2006). Other studies have pointed to the ambiguity (Fjelde 2009) or 
even spuriousness of the resource–conflict link (for example, Bulte/Brunnschweiler 2008). In 
any case, the exact causal mechanisms through which this link works—or does not work—
remain largely unknown. This paper deals with this persistent puzzle and takes a closer look 
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at the question of why—and particularly how—some resource-producing countries lapse in-
to internal violence, while others do not. In working to resolve this puzzle, the paper utilizes 
a context-sensitive approach, which systematically tests which causal mechanisms—and re-
lated resource-specific (RS) and non-resource-specific (NRS) conditions—can explain the di-
vergent levels of internal violence. Methodologically, it makes use of a controlled com-
parison of four oil producers—Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela—which share a number 
of theoretically-important similarities but which differ with regard to the levels of internal 
violence. 
The first section of the paper outlines the theoretical argument and identifies the three 
main causal mechanisms and submechanisms that presumably link resources to internal vio-
lence, and assigns RS and NRS conditions to these mechanisms. The second section summa-
rizes the up-to-now results of quantitative and other empirical studies, and also refers to ex-
isting shortcomings. The third section outlines the methodology of the small-N comparison, 
on which the paper concentrates. We then propose an innovative operationalization for the 
comparative test of causal mechanisms and related contextual conditions. We also introduce 
a more comprehensive measure of internal violence than the usual armed conflict onset or 
battle death indicators, including various other indicators for intensities and types of internal 
violence. The fourth section presents the major findings regarding the explanatory value of 
the causal mechanisms as well as country-specific results. Finally, the paper discusses these 
results against the backdrop of the current state of the debate, and draws a number of con-
clusions for theory and for future research. 
2 The Theoretical Argument: Causal Mechanisms Linking Resources and Violence 
A cause cannot exist without a causal mechanism connecting causes to effects, and a causal 
mechanism is more than a cause (Falleti/Lynch 2009). Causal mechanisms link cause(s) and 
effect(s) through a sequence and interaction of events, conditions, and processes. What, then, 
are the causal mechanisms of the resource–conflict link?1 In their seminal work on “greed 
and grievance,” Collier and Hoeffler (2004: initially, 1998) argue that the main mechanism is 
economic opportunity. Wealth—in the form of primary commodities—increases the likeli-
hood of the onset of civil war by providing the opportunity, and the related motive of 
“greed,” for armed rebel activity rather than by spurring conflict-promoting grievances.2  
                                                 
1  Unless otherwise indicated, “conflict” refers to “internal violent conflict.” 
2  Collier and Hoeffler actually mean economic opportunity when using the term “greed.” The catch-
phrase “greed and grievance” (“grievance” meaning deprivation of social groups rather than re-
source-induced grievances) obviously sounds better than “opportunity and grievance.” “Greed” 
and opportunity actually refer to economic (not just resource-related) opportunities. 
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These ideas have been further developed and modified in the literature.3 With regard to 
causal mechanisms, several different lists of such mechanisms have been developed (for ex-
ample, Ross 2004; Humphreys 2005; Le Billon 2008). These lists differ somewhat, but they 
generally state that natural resources promote violence through three major mechanisms and 
several submechanisms: (a) motive, (b) opportunity, and (c) indirect mechanisms such as 
detrimental impacts on institutions and socioeconomic development.  
The Motive Mechanism(s): The first main causal mechanism connects resources and vio-
lent conflict through motive, which Le Billon considers a “risk” for “resource wars” (Le Billon 
2008). Resources may be the source of conflict between several actors; violence may result 
from conflict over how the benefits and the costs of resource production are shared between 
different groups within a country.  
In order to achieve a higher precision, it seems fruitful to divide the mechanisms into 
subtypes according to geographical levels—as the actors involved and the scope of their ac-
tions will differ according to these levels. Hence, we deal with a motive mechanism at the na-
tional level if, for instance, the central government’s control of resources (and related reve-
nues) or the nationwide distribution of revenues is at the heart of a conflict; the subnational 
level comes into play when we talk about secessionist or autonomy-related conflicts between 
resource-producing regions and the central state (or other regions). Intercommunal conflicts 
within resource-producing regions over revenue distribution or the effects of resource pro-
duction also belong to this mechanism. Finally, internal conflicts over benefits—not so much 
costs—from resources may also be promoted by the vested interests of international actors (or 
rivals) in the resource reserves of the country in question, which make direct or indirect mili-
tary intervention in internal conflicts more likely.  
These subtypes of the motive mechanism are more likely to function when particular RS 
conditions are met. In some circumstances, these are necessary conditions in the logic of the 
mechanisms (for a systematic overview, see Table 1). Any motive-driven conflict over the dis-
tribution of revenues may be the consequence of the (perceived) uneven allocation of re-
source income or simply of the fact that there is too little to distribute because the abundance 
of resource income per capita is too low for the government to engage in large-scale distribu-
tion policies. The failure to implement environmentally-sensitive resource management may 
provoke grievances over ecological problems, such as oil spills. Uneven revenue distribution 
may also fuel intercommunal conflict in the resource-producing region. The emergence of 
“greedy outsiders” (Humphreys 2005) is more probable when the country has a strategically 
and financially valuable, but scarce, resource such as oil. Externally-induced escalation also 
becomes more likely when the country is a globally important producer and has not estab-
lished firm relationships with external allies that can provide effective outside protection.   
                                                 
3  For an overview of the literature, see also Samset (2009), Basedau and Lay (2009), Ross (2008), and 
Le Billon (2008). 
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Table 1: Indicators for Causal Mechanisms of the Resource–Conflict Link 
Main Causal  
Mechanisms 
Submechanisms Indicators for Contextual Conditions Involved (“risks”) 
RS (Resource-specific)  NRS (Non-resource-specific)  
Motive  
(“Resource War”):  
 
Conflict over costs and 
benefits of 
resource production  
National level: 
 
Emergence of nationwide 
conflict over resources 
- High dependence with effects on 
spending potential of the government 
- Low abundance relative to  
population size 
- No distributional policies  
- No cooptation of potential  
opposition leaders 
- Protest against the distribution of 
oil revenues  
General reinforcing risks (not 
included in mechanism)*: 
- Socioeconomic problems  
- Demographic pressures  
- Cultural diversity and  
relations 
- Confrontational agency of 
elites 
- Conflict history  
 Subnational level:  
 
Emergence of secessionist, 
autonomy-related,  
or intercommunal conflict 
in the resource-producing 
region 
- Concentration of resources in  
culturally distinct regions  
- Contested revenue distribution 
between resource-producing  
region and the central state  
- Ecological and socioeconomic 
stress due to resource production  
 
Reinforcing risks (included in 
mechanism): 
- Socioeconomic problems in 
the resource region*** 
- Demographic pressures in 
the resource region 
- Rough terrain in the resource 
region 
- Cultural diversity and  
relations, particularly in and 
with resource region ** 
- Conflict history in the  
resource region 
 International level: 
 
Direct or indirect  
intervention by  
“greedy outsiders” 
- Scarce but strategic/valuable re-
source(s) 
- High abundance relative to world 
production/reserves 
- Int’l geographical dispersion of 
resources and related disputes 
- Problematic relations with major 
importing countries 
Reinforcing risks (included): 
- Poor relations with major 
foreign countries, few allies - 
Evidence of foreign  
intervention  
- Conflict-prone regional/  
international environment 
Opportunity  
(“Conflict Resources”):  
 
Resources make  
rebellion/military  
action feasible 
Economic opportunity:  
 
Resources provide money 
to make rebellion 
financially feasible 
- Lootable technical mode of production  
- Resource companies’ personnel  
unprotected  
- Lack of government control over 
production sites/transport routes 
- Peripheral location of resources 
Reinforcing risks  
(not included): 
- Weak state, particularly weak 
security apparatus  
- Rough terrain in resource 
region 
 Military opportunity: 
 
Resource facilities, pro-
duction sites, and person-
nel offer easy targets for 
military action 
- Production sites/transport routes and 
personnel as easy military targets 
- Lack of government control over 
production sites/transport routes  
- Peripheral location of resources 
- Low spending of resource money 
on security apparatus  
Reinforcing risks (included): 
- Weak state, particularly weak 
security apparatus  
- Rough terrain in resource 
region 
Indirect mechanisms  
(“Resource Curse”):  
 
Resources have negative 
consequences for other 
areas, which in turn 
renders violence more 
likely 
Socioeconomic problems: 
 
Resource dependence  
creates socioeconomic 
problems that make the 
country vulnerable to  
violence 
- High dependence 
- Low abundance relative to  
population size 
- Wealth reduction due to MNCs’ share 
- Direct evidence of price shocks 
and other negative economic con-
sequences of resource production 
Necessary complementary 
risks (included): 
- Socioeconomic problems in-
cluding high inflation, slow 
growth, high unemploy-
ment, high poverty rates, etc.  
Weak state/institutions:  
 
Resource production (for 
example, via rent-seeking 
mentality) damages the 
effectiveness of institutions 
thereby making the coun-
try vulnerable to violence 
- High dependence 
- Low abundance relative to  
population size 
- Huge state sector 
- Corrupt and ineffective  
resource sector  
- No efforts to tackle resource-
related problems 
Necessary complementary 
risks (included): 
- Low effectiveness of state 
institutions and/or deteriora-
tion (ideally after discovery 
of resources or beginning of 
production) 
Source: Authors’ own compilation.  
Note: the list of non-resource risks is not necessarily exhaustive; for further details see main text.  
* Generally, classical risk factors such as socioeconomic and demographic factors are believed to reinforce all the 
mechanisms, hence they are only listed with the first mechanism (motive at the national level).  
** All indicators were included in the questionnaire. Please note that indicators can be part of several causal mechanisms.  
*** Several indicators summarized in an index. 
8 Basedau/Mähler/Shabafrouz: Revisiting the Resource–Conflict Link 
Non-resource-specific conditions (NRS) are also important for each subtype of the motive 
mechanism. First, classical NRS risk factors—such as rapid demographic change and eco-
nomic crisis—will increase the risk of violence (for example, Hegre/Sambanis 2006; Dixon 
2009), for instance, by making it easier to draw on grievances to recruit possible rebels. Addi-
tionally, or in conjunction with economic struggles, rebel leaders can draw on cultural differ-
ences between groups. Second, and more importantly, some of the mechanisms require the 
interaction of RS and NRS conditions. In the case of the “subnational secessionist mecha-
nism” major resource reserves have to be located within an area that shares a common ethnic 
or other social identity. A historical record of problematic relations with the central state and 
a relatively low level of development in the resource region will make it more likely that the 
mechanism will function.4  
The Opportunity Mechanism(s): The second main causal mechanism is based on the as-
sumption that natural resources will provide an opportunity for, or facilitate the feasibility of, 
warfare, or, in particular, rebellion. Understanding opportunity in a narrow sense,5 we can 
identify two subtypes of the opportunity mechanism. First, resources may provide the finan-
cial means for rebellion. Whether this is the case depends on several RS conditions (Le Billon 
2001). If rebels want to access resources and to trade them in order to generate the financial 
means necessary to maintain a rebel group, the resources should ideally be “lootable” (Ross 
2003). “Lootability,” refers to the type or, more precisely, the technical mode of extraction: 
alluvial diamonds that can be mined by artisanal means are more suitable in this sense than 
offshore oil, which requires sophisticated and expensive equipment and know-how. The ge-
ographical location also matters: if resources are located in peripheral regions this will fur-
ther contribute to a pro-rebellion opportunity structure. 
Second, rebels need not necessarily control resource production: resources might provide 
fruitful military targets, particularly when income from these resources is critical to the gov-
ernment. Rebels can attack production sites and sabotage transport facilities. Personnel can 
be kidnapped. The latter action not only boosts military opportunity but also provides a lu-
crative source of income, thus contributing to financial opportunity.  
The opportunity mechanism, at least the financial one, does not exclusively function 
through actual access to resources (or resource-production facilities that are within the range 
of immediate military action). If outside forces are ready to grant support in return for future 
                                                 
4  Sometimes it may be difficult to determine the difference between RS and NRS conditions. As a 
rule, we have defined conditions as resource-specific when any resource-related aspect was in-
volved, except for socioeconomic, demographic, and ethnic characteristics in the resource region, 
which we principally consider to be NRS conditions. 
5  In the strict sense, one may argue that motive is also part of an opportunity structure. It is true that 
it is often not entirely clear how to best distinguish motive from opportunity. An effective security 
apparatus, for instance, may also discourage possible rebels; grievances over revenue distribution 
increase the opportunity for rebels to recruit rank-and-file members. 
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gain (or “booty”)—in the event of victory—this will also contribute to a pro-rebellion struc-
ture (Ross 2004a)—although it can be argued that direct and actual access makes the oppor-
tunity mechanism more likely to work. Moreover, one should not look at the opportunity 
structure exclusively from a rebel perspective. From the government’s point of view, it is 
crucial to maintain firm control over the production sites and transit routes in order to limit 
rebel opportunity. Effective control will depend on the strength of the state as a whole and, 
more specifically, on the effectiveness of the security apparatus. These are principally NRS 
conditions, but they are often nevertheless related to resources. If the country really has 
abundant resources—relative to population size—it may have the financial means to estab-
lish a security apparatus that makes rebellion unfeasible. This shows that a resource-financed 
security apparatus is not necessarily a civil war risk. Resources will only fuel conflict over 
longer periods or facilitate the onset of conflict if they contribute to an equilibrium between 
government forces and rebels, which commonly means that the (weaker) rebels have RS op-
portunities, such as lootable resources (Ross 2004a). 
The Indirect Mechanism(s): A third key causal mechanism is based on the argument 
that resources do harm other areas, thus making countries indirectly vulnerable to the emer-
gence of violence. Again, we can think of subtypes, mostly inspired by the literature on the 
“rentier state” and the (economy-related) “resource curse” (Auty 2001; see also, Le Billon 
2008). In the case of the economic subtype it is expected that resources will damage economic 
prospects through the well-known side effects of resource-dependent rentier states: negative 
price shocks; the “Dutch Disease,” when the resource sector crowds out other sectors; the 
neglect of other sources of income (for example, education, manufacturing); or the wasting of 
resource income on economically harmful, prestigious projects (“white elephants”). Once re-
sources have contributed to economic crisis, the provision of public goods will become more 
difficult. As a consequence, violent conflict becomes more likely. Numerous empirical stud-
ies have shown that low income per capita and low economic growth are robustly linked to 
the onset of civil war (for example, Hegre/Sambanis 2006; Dixon 2009).  
The economic resource curse is not a predetermined fate, however, and whether it strikes 
or not depends to a great extent on contextual RS and NRS conditions—such as the actual 
policies of governments or how the economy was structured before the discovery of re-
sources. Last but not least, how much income from resources is actually available per capita 
also matters. It is also obvious that price shocks will hit those countries that are highly de-
pendent on resource exports the hardest—but only if prices actually plummet.6  
The institutional variant of the indirect mechanism—also referred to as the weak state 
mechanism—draws on the concept of the rentier state (Mahdavy 1970; Luciani 1987) and ar-
                                                 
6  Also, the losses in distributional potential have to fall below a critical threshold. If a country is still 
sufficiently resource rich in per capita terms, any price shocks resulting from dependence may 
have a limited effect. 
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gues that resource income represents rents, which foster rent-seeking behavior, if not out-
right corruption, which is damaging to the quality of institutions and weakens the state (see 
Fearon 2005; Fearon/Laitin 2003; Fjelde 2009).7 There are two principal variants of the weak 
state mechanism. First, abundant resource income might prevent governments from estab-
lishing an effective bureaucracy, with harmful consequences for social welfare and, in turn, 
internal peace, at least in the long run. Also, weak states will be conducive to rebellion given 
their lack of control over the entire territory, and resource-rich regions with (lootable) re-
sources in particular. Second, resources do not always proactively damage the quality of in-
stitutions; rather, they are detrimental if they happen to be discovered in countries where the 
institutions are already weak. An important contextual condition here is the quality of insti-
tutions before the discovery of resources or the beginning of resource production. Though it 
is difficult to measure, given the lack of historical data on institutional quality, it seems plau-
sible that a robust set of institutions—as found, for instance, in Norway before the beginning 
of oil production—may prevent a country from lapsing into violence. 
These causal mechanisms are possibly not completely exhaustive,8 and are not necessari-
ly mutually exclusive. It is possible or even likely that they interact, reinforcing or neutraliz-
ing each other. For instance, the motive mechanism at the subnational level should be com-
plemented by an opportunity mechanism in the resource region in question. Only the pres-
ence of both motive and opportunity are sufficient to explain a particular group behavior. 
The interplay and potentially mutually reinforcing or neutralizing effect of conditions and 
mechanisms makes the formulation of predictions a very demanding challenge. Hence, we 
should generally view these mechanisms as making violence more likely—but not as deter-
mining such an outcome. 
Finally, it is far from clear-cut that resources will have only a negative impact on peace. 
Several authors (for example, Le Billon 2001; Fjelde 2009; Basedau/Lay 2009), mainly drawing 
on rentier state theory, have shown that it is equally possible that resource-specific and other 
conditions can make conflict less likely due to the use of resource money for cooptation, dis-
tribution, or repression, and also because of outside protection, the funding for which is de-
rived from resource wealth (see also, Lujala and Rustad, forthcoming).  
3 Literature Review: Empirical Evidence from Quantitative and Comparative Studies 
What do we actually know about causal mechanisms and related conditions in the resource–
conflict link? Given the complexity of the link, and the apparent difficulty of capturing the 
many theoretically important resource-specific conditions within the causal mechanisms (see 
                                                 
7  Fearon (2003) uses income levels as a proxy indicator for a “weak state,” which can be equally as-
signed to the “economic crisis mechanism.” 
8  For additional submechanisms, see Basedau et al. (2011). 
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Ross 2004; Basedau/Wegenast 2009), it is not surprising that the question of how resources 
impact conflict—that is, through which contextual conditions and causal mechanisms—is 
still empirically underexplored and insufficiently explained.  
The main problem derives from certain methodological difficulties. Quantitative meth-
odologies are not ideally suited to the detection of exact causal mechanisms. Such methodol-
ogies aim to generalize, and tend to ignore the precise mechanisms at work in individual 
cases. Moreover, indicators (“proxies”) are limited in number—while causal mechanisms in-
volve numerous aspects—and are, if significant, open to divergent interpretations. For in-
stance, low income per capita can proxy a weak state or a weak economy. Almost all systemat-
ic studies on causal mechanisms conclude that more specific data is necessary (for example, 
Humphreys 2005; Sambanis 2005; Ross 2006). The lack of (adequate) data especially refers to 
the operationalization of institutional quality or economic grievances (Dixon 2009). Numer-
ous case studies do not share these problems and have revealed evidence of individual caus-
al mechanisms; however, they are often not comparable and are by nature incapable of dis-
covering general results.  
With the exception of a few works (for example, Ross 2004a; Collier/Sambanis 2005; 
Humphreys 2005; Basedau/Lay 2009), systematic quantitative and comparative studies that 
explicitly look at causal mechanisms are rare. For instance, Ross (2004a) tests a number of 
causal mechanisms for civil war onset in 13 cases in which resources and conflict are “most 
likely” connected. For conflict onset he finds evidence of neither opportunity (“looting”) nor 
motive (“grievances”) mechanisms, but he does find evidence of separatism in two cases (In-
donesia, Sudan) and two other mechanisms in three cases (Congo Republic: “future booty;” 
DRC: “foreign intervention;” Sierra Leone: “foreign intervention” and “future booty”). Em-
pirical support for mechanisms at work is more frequent with duration of conflict, particular-
ly for “looting” (all but two cases), though some of the mechanisms have also shortened the 
wars. However, the sample cannot explain differences in violence given the rather constant 
dependent variable, as the author frankly admitted (Ross 2004a: 49). 
Collier and Sambanis’ (2005) study consists of several in-depth case studies (for example, 
DRC, Indonesia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal) that test the Collier–Hoeffler model, in which re-
sources play a central role (Sambanis 2005: 308; see above). In comparing the case studies, 
Sambanis concludes that there is little evidence that resources cause civil wars due to motive 
or opportunity. However, resources—and functional NRS equivalents, such as looting and 
kidnapping—often sustain rebellion. He argues that research on the resource–conflict nexus 
should consider the interaction of resources with covariates such as external price shocks and 
the effects of resource production on regime type. 
Humphreys (2005) explicitly aims to “uncover” different causal mechanisms via econo-
metric techniques (and has developed probably the most extensive list of mechanisms so 
far), mainly by using different indicators for natural resources to distinguish between the 
mechanisms such as oil production, on the one hand, and reserves on the other. He finds lit-
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tle evidence of greedy rebels—which should be reflected by the higher significance of oil re-
serves than past production—but does identify grievances as the result of a weakened state. 
He concedes, however, that econometrics faces substantial problems in testing causal mech-
anisms, particularly due to the lack of data and to the results’ sensitivity to model specifica-
tions, and that his study has not been able to test all of the mechanisms. 
According to a meta-analysis of 14 econometric studies on the resource–conflict link by 
Ross (2004b), and to general meta-analyses of civil war correlates by Hegre and Sambanis 
(2006) and Dixon (2009), the only more or less robust influence is (the commodity) oil.9 This 
finding contradicts the opportunity mechanism, originally advocated by Collier and Hoeffler: 
oil is a less lootable resource, and lootable resources such as timber, narcotic plants, or alluvial 
diamonds explain at best the duration but not the onset of conflict (see Lujala et al. 2005;10 Le 
Billon 2008: 352).  
Why, then, are oil countries prone to (the onset of) civil war? First, as a recent study by 
Lujala (2010) finds, onshore oil, which is more lootable than offshore oil, is indeed more con-
flict-prone if subnational units—and not countries—are studied. A further explanation is that 
oil production often takes place in culturally different regions within a state tending to seces-
sionist or autonomist uprisings, such as Angola, Indonesia, and Nigeria (Hoeffler/Collier 
2006; Ross 2008). Others (Fearon/Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005) find evidence that the oil–violence 
nexus works through the weak state mechanism (see Ross 2006: 290–291) or can be attributed 
to the effects of sparse international networks in economic or political terms (Humphreys 
2005).  
Recent studies have tried to explain the differences within the group of oil countries. Ac-
cording to Fjelde (2009), the interaction of high levels of corruption and appropriable re-
                                                 
9  Smith (2004) looks at developing countries only, and does not find any evidence that oil production 
increases the risk of civil war onset. According to Hegre and Sambanis (2006: 531), only oil ex-
ports—not production or other resources—are marginally robust regarding their link to (minor not 
major) violent conflict. Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) confirm that oil increases the risk of civil war 
but state that other forms of violence—that is, coup d’états and violent unrest—are not linked to 
natural resources. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) have tested both resource dependence and 
abundance and find that resource abundance reduces the likelihood of civil war onset, while de-
pendence seems to be a consequence rather than a cause of civil war. 
10  They find that secondary diamonds are positively linked to the onset of ethnic civil wars only, 
while primary diamonds lower both the risk of civil war onset and civil war duration. Buhaug and 
Rød (2006) study the role of geographical factors in African civil wars from 1970 to 2001 by looking 
not at nation-states, but at subnational state units (“grid cells”). One of their hypotheses is that 
proximity to valuable resources increases the risk of civil war. However, their results are somewhat 
ambiguous. Proximity to oil is linked neither to secessionist nor other civil war onsets. The pres-
ence of diamonds in a region simply makes a non-territorial civil war onset more likely (but appar-
ently suppresses secessionism). Le Billon (2008) generally states that the results on “diamond wars” 
are not robust. 
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sources (oil wealth) reduces the conflict proneness of a country: the destabilizing effect of re-
source abundance is offset through the peace-buying effects of corruption. Basedau and Lay 
(2009) find that oil dependence increases the risk of civil war onset (U-shaped relationship), 
while high levels of abundance per capita substantially reduce the civil war risk once a par-
ticular (relatively high) threshold is surpassed. A medium-N analysis in the same work con-
centrates on 27 highly dependent net oil exporters in order to isolate the effects of abundance 
and rentier mechanisms that may explain the absence or presence of civil war onset. Accord-
ing to this analysis, abundant income from resources is apparently used to engage in large-
scale distribution and the establishment of a huge and effective security apparatus. In addi-
tion, oil-abundant states often enjoy protection from abroad, suggesting that international in-
fluence may not only spur conflict but can also contribute to internal peace.  
Both Fjelde and the latter study provide evidence of resource-related effects when the na-
tional motive mechanism does not work. Basedau and Lay propose that dependence is a 
risk—on the condition that the country does not have abundant resources per capita—while 
leaving open whether this is due to harmful economic effects arising from price shocks or a 
weak state mechanism. They find that “oil-poor” oil-exporting countries have weaker institu-
tions than oil-rich countries, thereby suggesting that a weak state mechanism is indeed at 
work but that state weakness is presumably not caused by dependence as such, but, rather, 
by low levels of oil abundance. Basedau and Wegenast’s (2009) medium-N study on RS con-
ditions among Africa’s main oil and diamond producers finds that deposits of these two 
commodities in the settlement regions of “minorities at risk” are a conflict risk supporting 
the “subnational motive mechanism”; resources in peripheral regions are even a necessary 
condition of civil war, which supports the opportunity mechanisms.  
To summarize the empirical evidence, there is support for the assumption that a number 
of RS conditions represent risks for civil war onset (oil exports, particularly if associated with 
low income per capita from exports or resources in general; high dependence; regional con-
centration of production/reserves in culturally distinct regions). However, the empirical test-
ing of causal mechanisms has so far been mostly superficial, at best. The best-supported 
mechanism is the “subnational motive” mechanism. There is also evidence for opportunity 
mechanisms, but they remain contested. Possibly due to the fact that it is difficult to measure 
motive at the national level, this mechanism receives little support; rather, there is evidence 
for when it does not work. Some support is found for indirect mechanisms, such as the weak 
state and the economic crisis mechanism, but the test remains indirect. The mechanism of in-
ternational motive has remained widely untested. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Comparative Design and Case Selection 
As detailed above, the most common research strategies—quantitative and single case stud-
ies—seem not to be perfectly devised for the study of the exact functioning of causal mecha-
nisms. In order to balance the advantages of individualization and the general scientific goal 
of generalization, it seems best to engage in a controlled comparison, particularly a small-N 
comparison that resembles a natural experiment (Sartori 1994). 
In order to exploit the full potential of a small-N comparative design, we have strived to 
select cases according to the principles of a most similar systems design (cf. Przeworksi/ 
Teune 1970; Sartori 1994). Cases should share a number of important similarities, but should 
differ with regard to the value of the dependent variable (conflict or, as detailed below, “in-
ternal violence”) in order to be able to better isolate potential causes for the former differ-
ence. With these principles in mind, we have created a sample of four “comparable oil ex-
porters,” comprising Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela. This sample does not completely 
match the strict requirements of a most similar systems design—which is in any case difficult 
to identify in natural settings—but the cases do have in common important RS and NRS 
conditions.  
During our period of investigation, limited to the period from the end of the Cold War—
which may have had different implications for the onset of civil war—until 2009 (1989–2009), 
the four cases have shared some key RS variables that have been identified in the literature as 
being important in the resource–conflict link. Most likely, the countries are rather “high risk” 
with regard to these conditions (see Web Appendix I, Table A3.2).11 First, the major resource 
type produced in these countries is oil—the most conflict-prone resource according to the lit-
erature. Though all the countries also have other valuable resources, they have been highly 
dependent on oil for decades and are major oil producers in their regions, with a considera-
ble share of production and reserves worldwide (but not an outstanding share, as in the case 
of Saudi Arabia). As a consequence, their economies have all been affected by the volatility of 
oil prices; the governments experienced serious declines in their spending potential between 
1980 and 1990—when oil prices were low—and benefited from the rise in oil prices after 
2000. Although the levels of income from oil differ somewhat, all four countries have a po-
tential oil income per capita that is well below the high threshold of approximately US$2,000 
per capita per annum identified by Basedau and Lay (2009) as generally being connected to 
internal peace. Moreover, resources are mainly produced in the peripheral regions of these 
countries, each of which has a primarily state-owned resource sector that is hampered by 
                                                 
11  All Annex Tables are available in the Web Appendix I and II (alternatively, see Basedau et al. 2011, Table A3.2), 
online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/excel/wp175_Appendix_II_Revisit 
ingResourceConflict_Final.xls> and at: <www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/ 
pdf/wp175_Appendix_I_RevisitingResourceConflict_Final.pdf>.  
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corruption. Overall, governments in these countries have had very limited success in tackling 
the negative economic effects of resource production. 
There is also a wide range of socioeconomic, historical, and political similarities, in par-
ticular classical risk factors and conditions identified by the GIGA project as being problem-
atic when combined with resource production (Web Appendix I, Table A3.2). All of these 
countries are not micro-states but have a considerably large population and are culturally 
heterogeneous (including the exclusion of at least one cultural group). These societies also 
suffer in a comparable way from substantial inequality and other social problems such as 
unemployment; the latter problem can be reasonably traced back, at least partially, to re-
source production. None of the countries shows a higher level of income (at least for 1989). 
Finally, each country experienced periods of instability before 1990, although the respective 
levels vary substantially, something which also holds true for a number of other differences 
we should bear in mind (see below). 
Yet, despite these similarities, the level of internal violent conflict in the four countries 
since 1990—the dependent variable—has differed substantially. Given the gross incompati-
bilities between various conflict databases on civil war onset or the cases in question,12 we 
have decided to use the broader concept of “internal violence.” This concept not only cap-
tures civil war in the strict sense—that is, armed conflict with the involvement of govern-
ment forces and with more than 25 battle deaths in a single year (UCDP/PRIO definition, see 
Gleditsch et al. 2002)—but also addresses intercommunal violence, and violence realized by 
an organized group against civilians without the involvement of state actors. We believe that 
this variable is more adequate for capturing politically and socially relevant violence. Given 
the imperfections of single indicators, we have determined the level of internal violence us-
ing a combination of indicators, including data on conflict onsets and the absolute and rela-
tive (to population size) number of battle deaths from civil war, and of victims of one-sided 
violence, utilizing data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme and the Peace Research 
Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) as well as from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) 
database at the Center for Systemic Peace. We have also added relative and absolute num-
bers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in order to capture the civilian cost 
of internal conflict.  
Our resulting index for internal violent conflict includes 12 variables (see Table 3.1 and 
Web Appendix I, Table A3.1) and has produced clear-cut differences between the countries. 
While Algeria has experienced massive internal violence (44 accumulated violence indicator 
                                                 
12  Data on Nigeria from UCDP/PRIO and MEPV in particular differ dramatically in terms of the 
number of victims. UCDP/PRIO data on Nigeria was not easily reconciled with country-expert 
knowledge and several qualitative analyses of national and international non-governmental organ-
izations.  
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ranks: 44),13 the level of violence in Venezuela has been fairly low (20). Iran (30) and Nigeria 
(32) find themselves in between these cases, at roughly equal levels. 
All the similarities outlined above are unable to explain these differences; hence, if we 
can identify further differences in the RS or NRS variables—combined in causal mechanisms 
as outlined in Section Two—then we have substantial evidence that the mechanisms in ques-
tion are the causes of the differences in the independent variable. The general logic of com-
parison is as follows: if causal mechanisms can explain the variation in internal violence, we 
expect that the most peaceful country—Venezuela—will demonstrate few risks and few ele-
ments of our causal mechanisms, while the most violent of the four—Algeria—should dis-
play the opposite. Iran and Nigeria should find themselves in between the two cases at an 
approximately equal level.  
Table 2: Levels and Dynamics of Internal Violence in Four Major Oil Exporters, 1989–2009 
 Algeria Iran Nigeria Venezuela 
Levels (1989–2009) High (44) Medium (30) Medium (32) Low (20) 
Source: Authors’ own compilation on the basis of UCDP/PRIO and MEPV conflict data on conflict onsets, battle 
deaths, and numbers of refugees and IDPs. Numbers in parentheses represent “cumulated violence indi-
cators ranks.” For further details, see Web Appendix I, Table A3.1 and the main text. 
We have to concede that there are several limitations to this approach. First, the conditions 
that are held as constant, such as degree of dependence or resource type, cannot explain the 
differences in the sample right from the outset but may have explanatory value in larger 
samples. External validity is therefore limited. The results apply to the given conditions. Se-
cond, there are still differences in the cases beyond the similarities outlined above. Differ-
ences are principally intended, and even necessary, since there have to be differences if we 
want to explain the divergent levels of internal violence. However, it may become difficult to 
isolate possible causes if there are competing explanatory variables or mechanisms. Moreo-
ver, we can never exclude the possibility that other conditions not captured through the 
analysis are superior in explaining the differences in the dependent variable. However, this is 
a challenge common to research and we have tried to take the idea of “few cases, many vari-
ables” (Przeworsiki/Teune 1970)—basic to small-N controlled comparisons— seriously, 
while maintaining a systematic approach. Hence, we have included as many relevant varia-
bles as possible, well beyond what the causal mechanisms outlined above explicitly suggest. 
Particularly, we included NRS conditions found to be classical civil war risks, and, if data al-
lowed, variables assigned to subnational units.14 
                                                 
13  Violence indicator ranks are assigned in a reverse order. The most violent value receives rank 4. 
14  The latter variables have been included to mitigate the problem of a national-level data bias 
(Snyder 2001). 
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4.2 The Operationalization of Causal Mechanisms and Contextual Conditions 
In order to systematically capture all of the above conditions and the related causal mecha-
nisms, we developed a comprehensive questionnaire with a total of 150 questions/variables 
systematically subdivided into the four clusters: “Resource-specific” (RS); “Non-resource-
specific” (NRS); “Domestic;” and “International” conditions, which was designed to capture 
all theoretically relevant variables. The variables were primarily selected according to the 
causal mechanisms as discussed in Section Two, but were supplemented by variables known 
from the study of civil war in general—which until now have been neglected by the resource 
curse literature and the rentier state theory (for example, Hegre/Sambanis 2006; Dixon 2009). 
Variables were then systematically assigned to causal mechanisms. For example, a loot-
able mode of extraction was assigned to the economic opportunity mechanism, while abun-
dance per capita and distributional and clientelistic policies were included in the motive 
mechanism at the national level; we assigned the location of resources in culturally distinct 
regions and ecological stress to the subnational (or secessionism) motive mechanism (see Ta-
ble 1, and Web Appendix I, Table A 4.3).  
Some of the RS variables were assigned to several mechanisms at the same time. De-
pendence and price shocks, for instance, are equally important for motive (national level) 
and the indirect “economic crisis” mechanism. Especially for the indirect mechanisms, par-
ticular NRS conditions are necessary complementary conditions. The “economic crisis” 
mechanism requires not only price shocks or other resource-related economic distortions but 
also that NRS social and economic problems—such as inflation and slow growth—occur. For 
the direct mechanisms, NRS conditions can reinforce the functioning of a particular mecha-
nism but are not necessary conditions.  
The identification of a causal mechanism followed strict rules. We defined which value of 
the respective indicator would be considered to indicate the presence of this element of the 
causal mechanism. Generally, we fixed thresholds for these elements of the mechanisms, 
which we call “risks.” As a rule, these were over or below the world’s median respectively 
(depending on the construction of the variable), when quantitative data were concerned. We 
deviated from this principle only when there were established categories, such as the level of 
human development (Human Development Index: low, medium, high) or income (World 
Bank income groups: low income, middle income, high income). In the case of the expert as-
sessments, the risk thresholds commonly corresponded to the worst assessment on our scales 
for a particular item, which were mostly constructed as binary.15 All risk thresholds are pre-
sented in Web Appendix II.16 
                                                 
15  In the case of three (or, rarely, four) option scales, we deviated in a couple of cases from our gen-
eral rule of defining the worst assessment as a risk when it seemed theoretically justified. For in-
stance, we already consider medium, not just strong, levels of protest against resource production 
as a risk. A risk already exists when we have a record of minor civil war, not just of a major one. It 
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Once we had assessed the individual “risks” of which a particular mechanism consists 
we then assessed the evidence for its over-all presence: if at least 75 percent of all such risks 
for a particular causal mechanism are present (= 75 percent consistency), we believe that 
there is “strong” evidence that the causal mechanism is functioning. Fifty percent of the re-
quired risks in the respective mechanisms or more consistency but less than 75 percent rep-
resents “some,” 25 percent “little,” and less than 25 percent “no” evidence for the causal 
mechanism in question. In the case of mostly indirect mechanisms that combine RS and (nec-
essary complementary) NRS conditions—such as the economic crisis mechanism—we calcu-
lated the consistency separately, with the possible result of “in-between” assessments (for 
example, “little to some”). After assessing the evidence regarding the presence of causal 
mechanisms in an individual country—and at several points in time—we compared the four 
country cases, assessing whether the causal mechanisms could explain the divergent levels of 
violence. 
Generally, it remained possible to test all NRS and RS risks and variables as clusters or 
individually, and without explicit reference to a causal mechanism, allowing for a substantial 
element of inductive control.17 As detailed above, the period of investigation starts in 1989. In 
order to be able to control for the developments in the following two decades, we measured 
the variables not only in 1989 but also in 1999 and 2009. This also allowed us to measure the 
dynamics of the variables.18 
We used a mixed approach with regard to data type. If possible and reasonable, we used 
quantitative data or indicators (that is, objective data) for the questionnaire. This was mainly 
feasible with socioeconomic indicators but was also partly possible for relations between ethnic 
groups. If valid quantitative indicators were not available, which was the case for about half of 
all variables, we made use of expert assessments—which we do not judge as second best. Two 
researchers within the project have studied the four countries under investigation for more 
than two years and have carried out extensive field work in all four country cases; this has re-
sulted in detailed studies (for example, Mähler 2009; 2010; Shabafrouz 2009; 2010).19 
                                                                                                                                                        
is sufficiently risky to have mixed relations with neighboring countries. Not all bilateral relations 
have to be hostile in order to constitute a risk. 
16 The Web Appendix II is accessible at: <www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/pub 
likationen/excel/wp175_Appendix_II_RevisitingResourceConflict_Final.xls>.  
17  Due to space constraints, the results on the explanatory value of individual variables and their clus-
ters, as well as the dynamics of violence, are not reported in this paper. These results are detailed in 
Basedau et al. (2011) (and Web Appendix I).  
18  A number of variables were measured only at one point in time. These included variables captur-
ing events before 1989 and some variables for which changes were not expected (such as the pres-
ence of other substantial resources or the geographical dispersion of resources, see Web Appen-
dix I, Table A4.3). 
19  The qualitative or quantitative type of data is presented in Web Appendix II (questionnaire). 
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The questionnaires were completed by the country experts. A thorough review process 
within the project group confirmed the validity and reliability of the assessments. After the 
questionnaires were completed, we analyzed the variables vis-à-vis the causal mechanisms, 
other clusters of variables, and individual variables, as well as country-specific findings ac-
cording to the logic outlined in the previous subsection.  
5 Results 
The results will be presented as follows: First, we assess the evidence regarding the individ-
ual causal mechanisms and assess whether they meaningfully distinguish the cases accord-
ing to the levels of violence. Second, we present a combined mechanism including several re-
source-specific and non-resource-specific variables, which may help to explain better the var-
iance in our dependent variable. These results are then discussed against the backdrop of 
country-specific evidence and the current state of the debate on the resource–conflict link. 
5.1 Causal Mechanisms 
The assessment of the causal mechanisms follows a two-step procedure. First, we have to as-
sess whether evidence of the proposed mechanisms is present in a country and a year or, 
more precisely, whether there is potential that they are working. Second, we have to evaluate 
whether or not the evidence differentiates the country cases according to the level of violence. 
As evidenced in Table 3 (see also Web Appendix I, Table A4.3), for all the various causal 
mechanisms there is at least one instance in which there is “strong” evidence of the presence 
of the mechanism.  
However, differences in the evidence of causal mechanisms are mostly unable to explain 
the differences in levels of violence (see Table 3, last column). This is true of motive at the na-
tional and international level and all opportunity mechanisms. The subnational motive 
mechanism works insofar as Venezuela, as the most peaceful country, shows little evidence 
while all the others have more pronounced risks. The two countries with medium levels of 
violence both display strong evidence of such a mechanism. The indirect economic mecha-
nism also displays this finding. Venezuela20 again shows less evidence than all other cases, 
each of which shows at least some evidence. This is also roughly true for the indirect institu-
tional mechanism. 
In looking at the countries, we should discuss not only the evidence of the causal mecha-
nisms in the individual countries but also whether they match the kind of violence that we 
actually find. In particular, support for the “subnational motive” mechanism should coincide 
                                                 
20  It is true that the instability around 1990 can be explained well by an economic crisis mechanism. 
However, this level of violence was very low compared to the other cases. 
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with fighting in the producing region, while motive at the national level should, in contrast, 
be associated with no apparent geographical concentration of fighting. 
Table 3: Evidence of Individual Causal Mechanisms Linking Resources to Conflict 
(1989–2009) 
Causal  
mechanisms  
Submechanisms N of indi-
cators* 
Algeria Iran Nigeria Venezuela Does mechanism 
explain different 
level of violence 
after 1989? 
Motive National 10 Some ↓ Some ↓ Strong 
↓ 
Some ↓ No*** 
Subnational* 16 (8/8) Little to 
some → 
Strong 
→ 
Strong 
→ 
None to 
little → 
Weak tendency 
(Venezuela best) 
International* 15 (8/7) None ↑ Strong↓ Some to 
strong ↓ 
None to 
little ↑ 
No*** 
Opportunity Financial 4 Little → Little→ Strong 
→ 
Strong → No 
Military 6 Some ↓ Some ↓ Strong 
→ 
Some ↔ No 
Indirect  Economic* 23 (8/15) Some to 
strong ↓ 
Some to 
strong ↓ 
Strong 
↓ 
Some ↓ Weak tendency 
(Venezuela best) 
Institutional/ 
weak state* 
14 (4/10) Some to 
strong ↓ 
Some to 
strong ↓ 
Strong 
→ 
Some ↑ Weak tendency 
(Venezuela best)  
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
* Causal mechanism combines RS and NRS risks. First number indicates total number, second and third (both in 
brackets) indicate RS and NRS, respectively. 
** Several indicators summarized in index. 
Arrows indicate development of evidence of causal mechanisms in 1999 and 2009 (↓ less; ↑ more; → approximate-
ly equal). 
*** If percentages and not levels (25%/50%/75%) are taken into account there is a weak tendency (Venezuela best). 
For further details on operationalizations, see Web Appendix I, Table A 4.3 and the main text. 
Nigeria is, apparently, the case with the highest risk stemming from resource-related causal 
mechanisms (Mähler 2010). Nigeria demonstrates clear evidence of more than one causal 
mechanism; namely, motive at the subnational level, combined with strong support for all 
opportunity mechanisms and two indirect mechanisms—the “economic crisis” and “institu-
tional damage” transmission channels. There is also strong evidence of the national motive 
mechanism for 1989; however, this decreases to “some” in the following years. This certainly 
matches with the findings of country experts, which suggest that resources have been harm-
ful in multiple ways for Nigeria, but particularly with respect to violence in the producing 
region (Niger Delta) (Watts 2008; Obi 2004).21 This finding, however, has to be put in perspec-
tive. Violence in the Niger Delta has been of a rather low intensity. The most extreme blood-
shed since 2001 has resulted from ethno-religious clashes in the north, due to which, accord-
ing to MEPV data, 55,000 people have perished. 
                                                 
21  Anecdotal evidence also reveals that the selling of arms to rebels by the military (and the availabil-
ity of small arms in general) has contributed to the feasibility of rebellion, though this kind of op-
portunity is not captured by the questionnaire. 
Basedau/Mähler/Shabafrouz: Revisiting the Resource–Conflict Link 21 
The second strongest evidence for resource-related mechanisms is found in Iran. The re-
sults return strong evidence of motive at the subnational level, reflecting the problems in 
several resource-rich regions between Kurdish and Arab Iranians. However, opportunity 
mechanisms find very limited support, which possibly explains the relatively low salience of 
actual violent conflict in these regions. For 1989, evidence of international motives proves 
strong (and only decreases to “some to strong” for 2009); this is generally in line with the an-
ecdotal evidence. Kurds and other groups probably receive outside support, and Iran’s ex-
ternal relations are chronically problem-ridden. History also offers numerous examples of 
indirect or direct external interventions, in particular the CIA-sponsored coup in 1953 and 
Saddam Hussein’s attack on Iran in 1980. Otherwise, we find rather limited support for 
causal mechanisms related to resources in Iran.  
In the case of Algeria there is surprisingly little evidence of pronounced resource-related 
causal mechanisms being at work. We do not find strong, uncontested evidence of any causal 
mechanism. It is only for the indirect economic and institutional mechanisms that we find 
“some to strong” evidence. This finding matches with general assessments that the bloody 
Algerian civil war was facilitated by, rather than caused by, resources (Shabafrouz 2010, 
Lowi 2004)—namely, as a result of price shocks and the decreased oil revenues in the 1980s. 
Due to the dependence on these resources, a shrinking “honey pot” had to be distributed 
among a growing population. Opposition was channeled into Islamism, but a transition to 
democracy was blocked in 1992 by an inflexible regime that tried to stay in power at any 
cost, once it had become clear that the Islamists would win that year’s elections. 
A look at Venezuela generally confirms the low-risk profile of the country vis-à-vis re-
sources, and that the rather low evidence for resource-related causal mechanisms is in line 
with the actual conflict level. We do not find any instances of a strongly supported causal 
mechanism throughout all points of observation, except in the case of opportunity. This re-
sult is somewhat puzzling because Venezuela is usually not one of the showcases for re-
source looting. However, we have to keep in mind that our indicators mainly point to a po-
tential (not necessarily direct evidence that the activity in question is occurring); there is in-
deed military opportunity in connection with resources in Venezuela. As there is little evi-
dence of motive, particularly at the subnational level, it comes as little surprise that Venezue-
la has not suffered from such a conflict. 
Summing up our comparative results, we find that three mechanisms are of some ex-
planatory value. First, motive at the subnational level explains why Venezuela has experi-
enced little violence whereas Nigeria and Iran have seen medium levels of violence. However, 
only in the case of Nigeria is there also a pro-rebellion (financial) opportunity structure. Se-
cond and third, the indirect economic and institutional mechanisms also hold some explana-
tory power: (limited) institutional and economic problems as a result of resource production 
also explain the limited violence in Venezuela as compared to the other cases. Generally, 
however, the comparative explanatory value of our causal mechanisms remains limited. 
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None of the mechanisms can explain why violence reached such high levels in Algeria. 
Hence, according to our approach, resources and the related causal mechanisms are insuffi-
cient to explain the different levels of violence. 
5.2 A Combined Perspective 
In order to identify a causal mechanism that does not exclusively rely on natural resources as 
the direct or indirect cause of violence, we make use of the findings of the individual varia-
bles that partly explain the differences between the cases (for details, see Web Appendix II). 
These 30 variables serve as a starting point for a combined mechanism that may be able to ex-
plain the differences between the cases. In order to find a more parsimonious mechanism, we 
omitted all variables that were some sort of double measurement (particularly with regard to 
the deprivation of the resource region or the relations between identity groups), and which 
had proved somewhat contradictory (two measures for inequality had opposite results).22  
This procedure resulted in altogether 13 variables which represent a mix of several clus-
ters of variables that are also well-known from the study of civil war: resource-specific varia-
bles (mainly dealing with the resource region), geographical characteristics, and socioeco-
nomic problems—as well as data on intergroup relations, political institutions, and elite be-
havior. The selected variables also show an equilibrated mix of structural variables and vari-
ables covering agency—such as protest by the population, political exclusion from ethnic 
groups, and government reactions to protest. The data type, however, is imbalanced. There 
are only three variables measured by quantitative indicators; this suggests that more explan-
atory variables have to be captured qualitatively.23 
As it turns out, the combined mechanism explains the divergent levels of violence after 
1989 fairly well: Algeria demonstrates the presence of 100 percent of the risks, while Iran and 
Nigeria display 62 percent. Venezuela has merely 8 percent of the risk factors. The combined 
mechanism leaves space for different country profiles. Algeria displays all risks (this might 
be debatable with regard to the actual problems in the resource region). Iran and Nigeria dif-
fer from one another with regard to severe ideological conflicts (only in Iran) and the politi-
cization of the military (for 1989, only in Nigeria), though subsequent events reverse the find-
ings for later years (for 2009 the military in Iran is more politicized than in Nigeria). 
                                                 
22  Some refinement proved inevitable: We added one variable—nationwide protest against the condi-
tions of oil production—in order to include the national level of resource politics in the mechanism.  
23  The variables measured by quantitative indicators are: ethnic dominance, exclusion from power of cul-
tural groups, and illegitimate political institutions. 
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Table 4: Indicators of a “Combined Mechanism”  
Risk indicators/countries 
 
Algeria Iran Nigeria Venezuela 
Resources located in regions with historical intercultural problems? Yes Yes Yes No 
Substantial nationwide protests against the distribution of oil money? Yes No No No 
Protest against conditions of oil production (resource region)? 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Resource region less developed than the country? Yes Yes Yes No 
High nationwide unemployment? 
Yes Yes Yes No 
National geographical characteristics highly favorable for rebellion?  
Yes No No No 
Ethnic dominance? Yes No No No 
High level of tension between social groups? Yes No No Yes 
Severe ideological conflicts? 
Yes Yes No No 
Exclusion from power of cultural groups nationwide/resource region? Yes Yes Yes No 
Strong politicization of the military? Yes No Yes No 
Illegitimate political institutions?? Yes Yes Yes No 
Mainly repressive government reactions to protest? Yes Yes Yes No 
N of “risks” 13 9 9 1 
Percent of risk factors  100% 62% 62% 8% 
Level of violence after 1989 High Medium Medium Low 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
6 Conclusion 
Despite a large body of literature on the resource–conflict link, little systematic empirical re-
search on the exact causal mechanisms linking resources to violence has been carried out. 
Engaging in a controlled small-N comparison, this paper has attempted to contribute to the 
filling of this gap. It has compared four major oil exporters that: (a) share a number of key re-
source-specific and other similarities that are, according to the literature and to our own pre-
vious studies, relevant for the resource–conflict link but (b) differ substantially with regard 
to the levels of violence. Thus, we have been able to, at least partly, isolate crucial contextual 
conditions and related causal mechanisms. As the various large-N and medium-N studies 
suggest that a much broader set of variables than commonly tested may be important, we 
created a comprehensive questionnaire, totaling more than 150 questions. We ordered varia-
bles theoretically by distinguishing between domestic and international—as well as resource-
specific (RS) and non-resource-specific (NRS) conditions. We particularly tested a number of 
causal mechanisms presented in the literature on the resource–conflict link. We carefully op-
erationalized the altogether seven mechanisms by assigning RS and NRS indicators to them 
and measuring them at several points in time. 
The results suggest that the role of resources may be less prominent in the outbreak and 
intensity of violence than even the most recent quantitative studies on the resource–conflict 
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link assume. Only three resource-related causal mechanisms have some explanatory value 
(motive at the subnational level, indirect economic and institutional ones). However, they on-
ly distinguish Venezuela, the most peaceful case, from all the others; Nigeria, which shows 
the most RS risks and evidence of resource-related causal mechanisms, displays only a me-
dium level of violence. The rather limited evidence of resource-related causal mechanisms in 
Algeria suggests that massive internal violence does not directly result from conflict over re-
sources, but rather from conflict over resources in conjunction with other variables. Price 
shocks contributed to the outbreak of violence in Algeria, but they are insufficient to explain 
this development because other countries were equally affected by them. Other factors—
such as failed development strategies, demographic developments, and a blocked democrat-
ic transition—have, therefore, to be taken into account. 
The need to combine factors is supported by the fact that only a mixed mechanism can 
convincingly explain the differences in the dependent variable between the countries. This 
mechanism does include resources, but they are only one element among others, and a rather 
minor one at that. It seems that only the combination of resource-related risks with economic 
and geographic characteristics, identity intergroup relations, and political and institutional 
variables—including elite behavior—can sufficiently explain internal violence.  
Our results are far from being perfect and should not be overestimated. Holding im-
portant resource-specific variables such as dependence and resource type as relatively con-
stant facilitated the isolation of the role of other phenomena but did not allow us to judge the 
general impact of these constant variables. Nevertheless, it seems that it would be fruitful to 
proceed further with this path in order to systematically address complexity. Future research 
should expand the sample by looking at additional countries, something which was clearly 
beyond the scope of this paper given the extensive time needed to conduct research for every 
country within our sample.  
The operationalization of a number of mechanisms can probably be refined, though it 
will be difficult to obtain the necessary data. For instance, looking at institutional quality be-
fore and after the discovery/beginning of resource production will facilitate the study of 
whether resources really weaken institutions and the state, and thus whether they render in-
ternal violence more likely. However, it proved impossible to obtain such data for our cases 
as they have been resource producers for several decades.  
Further, other and new variables may be included in the studies or our questionnaire. As 
it has proven difficult to directly measure motive—we would have to know the intentions of 
actors—it may make sense to expand efforts to study the discourse of rebels and govern-
ments or to directly ask leaders, as well as the rank and file, about their motivations, some-
thing which has only been done in a limited number of cases (see Hoeffler, forthcoming). 
Generally, it might be useful to systematically expand a multilevel analysis beyond the dif-
ferentiation of the motive mechanisms (looking at both the micro- and macro-levels).  
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It will be also important to test different forms of violence (for example, civil war in the 
narrow sense or international conflicts) and to further elaborate on the dynamics of violence 
within causal mechanisms. We have concentrated on conditions and context as part of causal 
mechanisms, not so much on sequence (though we mainly looked at 1989 and what hap-
pened afterwards). 
Finally, more specific methodological challenges persist. This refers not only to the ongo-
ing need to systematically collect data at the micro- and the subnational level, and on actual 
behavior rather than structural variables, but also to questions regarding how thresholds can 
be fixed or scales constructed. In any case, the complexity of the resource–conflict link still 
leaves many questions unanswered and will continue to pose a number of difficulties for fu-
ture research. We should not, however, give in to this complexity but should rather rise to 
the challenges of it. 
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